In Defense of Moneyball

Since Michael Lewis released Moneyball in 2003, the book has been met with criticisms from sports journalists, loudmouths and people within the game. Recently on Bill Simmons’ BS Report, sports writer Buzz Bissinger (author of Friday Night Lights) offered the latest set of criticisms. Given Bissinger’s attack, the announcement of the Moneyball movie (if Brad Pitt was playing one of my rivals I would be taking shots too), and the recent struggles of the Oakland A’s I feel it is important to defend why the themes of Moneyball have been and still are, relevant to major league baseball.

One criticism Bissinger posed was that Billy Beane merely got lucky. According to Bissinger, Beane was able to catch lightning in a bottle when 3 ace-caliber pitchers all developed and rose to the major leagues at the same time: Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder and Barry Zito. Bissinger asserts (and rightly) that these three pitchers played a major and understated role in Oakland’s success. What Bissinger doesn’t acknowledge is that it was Beane’s unorthodox evaluation of pitching that allowed him to acquire these pitchers in the first place. In Moneyball, Lewis describes how many teams passed on drafting Barry Zito because of his lack of velocity. Ignoring Zito because of his 87 mph fastball was something Beane saw as an oversight. Where other teams saw nothing, Beane saw a pitcher who didn’t give up walks, something that would translate into success in the major leagues. Bissinger is right to attribute Oakland’s success to the dominance of the big three, but he is wrong if he fails to acknowledge Beane’s role in seeing value in these pitchers while others didn’t.

One of the most common criticisms of the Beane/Moneyball philosophy, (and one echoed by Bissinger) is that Beane completely ignores things like heart, player makeup and team chemistry in building a team. These critics like to paint Beane and his crew as emotionally devoid automatons that see computers and statistics as the exclusive means to winning in major league baseball. This criticism also ignores much of the approach to building a team that Lewis outlines. Beane sees makeup as a major factor in assessing players. In the book, Beane describes an experience from his own playing days of how Lenny Dykstra was able to draw on every success while letting failures roll right off his back. This was something Beane saw as crucial to the makeup of an MLB player, and something he wasn’t able to do himself during his own playing career. This focus on makeup is one of the reason’s Beane valued all around good guy Nick Swisher as highly as he did during the amateur draft while passing on other players. Lewis goes as far as to outline an entire ranking system that Beane and his scouts used to evaluate a players based on makeup and character prior to the draft. To accuse Beane of not caring about makeup is like accusing Paris Hilton of reading too much, it’s just not true.

Other shots at the A’s system include pointing out that Oakland teams did not excel at getting on base despite the value placed on OBP, or that highly touted A’s prospects like Jeremy Brown fizzled out without making an impact in the majors. While the above-mentioned things are undoubtedly true this does not mean that Oakland’s system has failed. Almost ten years after the book has been written, no one can debate the value of the statistical analysis that Beane popularized throughout baseball (although Lewis gives much credit to Sandy Alderson, Bill James and the STATS Inc. homeboys before Beane). A whole school of GM’s have begun to emulate the work of Beane (Theo Epstein, JP Ricciardi and Paul DePodesta). Baseball may be about heart, but the statistical revolution has show that it may be a little more about numbers than some people would care to admit. And yes, many of Beane’s prospects have failed to make an impact in the major leagues but so did John Ford-Griffin and Dave Parrish (look at the Yankees draft record during the same period if these names are unfamiliar).

These failures have more to do with Beane’s situation in Oakland than his lack of skill as a GM. Critics need to remember that Beane was and is working with one of the smallest payrolls in baseball. With little margin for error, it becomes about getting the best players you can within a budget, not the best players period. Would Beane have drafted players above Jeremy Brown if he had more money to sign draft picks? Of course. Would his team have a higher OBP if he could afford to sign or keep players that get on base? Definitely.

There are still many people that want to reject the lessons and ideas put forth in Moneyball. Casting Jonah Hill to play Paul DePodesta makes this increasingly clear. Ultimately, Moneyball and the work of Billy Beane in Oakland is not about on base percentage and strike throwing pitchers, it is about finding inefficiencies in the market for baseball players that allow the A’s to compete. As skills like OBP have become valued properly (i.e. other teams flush with cash want to sign players with these skills sets) Beane has been forced to find other inefficiencies. The A’s recent struggles have suggested that he may not have been able to find the next great inefficiency to exploit. However, this search for inefficiencies will always be important and valuable to fielding a winning baseball team, whether it is through exploiting statistics, signing undervalued veterans (ESPN’s Rob Nyer has suggested this may be the next market inefficiency), or using raccoon meat in concession stand hotdogs. That is why the lessons of Moneyball should not be overlooked.