Jays Notes

There’s been lots to talk about in camp Blue Jays these days. Here’s one man’s opinion on all of the Jay’s happenings.

Guerrero Signing
Low risk usually means low reward, and if we were to calculate the odds of the Guerrero signing working out positively, little to no contribution from Vlad is probably the most likely outcome. That isn’t to say however, the Jays can’t get lucky and, as Eno Sarris pointed out, see Guerrero enjoy some success against lefties in the DH slot. Production aside, the chance to see a player as prestigious as Guerrero in a Jays uniform and the possibility of the comic bedlam that would ensue if he saw time in the field, is reason enough to give Vlad a shot.

Lawrie Suspension
To borrow a page from the realist school of international relations (I’ve been out of school for a while now, so I hope I have this right), if we want to curb this type of behaviour, we need MLB to flex some muscle. If the league really wants to create a disincentive for this kind of behaviour, hit the player where it hurts and fine them. It boils my blood as much as the next guy to see umpires entice players - I am happy to see umpires like Bob Davidson get his come-uppins, but I’m still not sold on robot umpires just yet.

Hot(ish) Start and Playoff Chances
Let’s talk in late July. Did we not learn anything from last year’s collapses? Baltimore was in first place last year too and it didn’t last. So was Cleveland. Boston won’t be under .500 for much longer either. While they Jays are off to a pretty decent start, the good folks at Getting Blanked pointed that some of the starting pitcher’s peripheral stats (K/ BB rate, BABIP) suggest that a regression may be coming. As the Orioles will most likely prove, it’s probably too early to get excited. With that said, the Jays’ potential to improve, either through trades or the promotion of prospects means that there is more to be hopeful about this year than there was in the past. Fingers crossed.

Lind Demotion
It’s hard to see Lind sent down, everyone (myself included), was rooting for the happy-go-lucky Hoosier to succeed. As remote as it now appears that he will be able to figure things out, here’s hoping that he can still turn things around. Fresh on the heels of the Lind demotion, I can’t help but think of another underachieving Blue Jay: Colby Rasmus. Rasmus, has been almost as bad as Lind at the plate over the past season and a half (.216/.291/.365 slash line this season). I was very excited when I heard the Jays acquired Rasmus last year, but Rasmus is now almost 700 plate appearances removed from his 2010 season. In addition to providing defensive value that Lind cannot, Rasmus is also 3 years younger than Adam Lind.

Phillies Trade Rumors
If the Phillies are interested in trading Cole Hamels or Shane Victorino (and I doubt they are), bring ‘em on board. Hopefully the Jays’ are connected to lots of major trade candidates and free agents moving forward. Especially top line starting pitchers like Hamels. The Jays’ system appears to be deep enough that parting with one or two high tier prospects won’t deplete the system and I think they are close enough to contention that they can justify absorbing the additional salary. If it’s the right fit. This is no way an endorsement on signing Prince Fielder.

Fantasy Flyer: Rick Porcello

Few young pitchers have been more frustrating than Rick Porcello over the last few years – in both reality and in fantasy baseball. Like the girl harbouring a grudge when getting back into the dating game, we’ve all been “hurt before” by Rick Porcello types. But this year, in deep leagues, It might be worthwhile to once again roll the dice on Porcello. If he is able to put things together, Porcello could provide surprising value at the back of your fantasy rotation.

One of the biggest storylines coming into 2012, was the Tigers’ abhorrent infield defence. Porcello, along with fellow groundball inducer, Doug Fister, were the pitchers believed to suffer most from Detroit’s infield made of stone. While the Tigers’ infield defence will no doubt hurt him, Detroit institutions Miguel Cabrera and Jhonny Peralta have been hurting Porcello’s numbers for the last few years. The addition of Fielder may not be as drastic as we are led to believe. The increase in WHIP and ERA may be offset by the extra win opportunities Procello should have playing for the Tigers and pitching in the AL Central.

Infield defence and win totals aside, there are other reasons why I am optimistic Porcello can be a good buy low fantasy candidate. Right now, Porcello has an ERA of 5.64 and xFIP of 3.64. The past two seasons, Porcello has posted ERA’s of 4.92 and 4.75 while his xFIP has come in at 4.24 and 4.04. While the poor Tigers defence will probably continue lead to an ERA that remains somewhat higher than his xFIP; Porcello’s xFIP does suggest that we should see some improvement in his performance. There is also reason to be slightly optimistic about Porcello’s ability to build further upon his skillset. Right now, Porcello’s value comes from his ability to prevent walks and induce groundballs. Mike Podhorzer at Fangraphs has noted that Porcello has increased his fastball velocity by 1.7 mph this year. If Porcello is able to increase his strikeout rate to over 5 K/9; like it was in the minor leagues, it would go a long way in adding to his fantasy value.

To pepper in some anecdotal evidence. Baseball Prospectus scouts Kevin Goldstein and Jason Parkes (on their podcast Up and In), both discussed that coming into the 2012 season, neither would be surprised if Porcello can put it all together and take the next step. Keith Law, scout for ESPN, has also written that he believes Porcello improve on his 2011 performance. It’s also easy to forget that Porcello is still only 23 years old. To assume he has reached his peak may be premature. While it also may be premature to roster Porcello in a standard 10 team mixed league, in deeper leagues, gambling on Porcello now may pay off sooner rather than later.

Maybe, Possibly, Potentially: Why Bad Closers Mean Some Managers Might Be Thinking Differently About Bullpen Management

Among the analytical and Sabermetic community of baseball writers, one issue that generates more scorn per capita than any other topic is Major League organizations’ use of relief pitchers. Central to this criticism are managers, “managing to the save”. Managing to the save means assigning one reliever, in most cases your best, to pitch the last inning of any game where your team is leading by one to three runs. Hence this reliever gets the save.

A long line of writers and analysts have screamed like Al Pacino in Scarface about how this is a misusage of bullpen arms. To summarize a body of work that is vast, precise, and usually unnecessarily cruel; pigeonholing your best pitcher into a role that requires he pitch one inning (and one inning only) at the very end of the game when a save is on the line is not the best way to use your top bullpen arm. The reasoning suggests that there are many instances where using your best reliever earlier in the game during a tight situation - say for example, in the 7th inning of a tie game with the heart of the order coming up, is more valuable. Admittedly, this is a quick and dirty version of the how Major League teams could better utilize their bullpens; but it’s not hard to see that having your closer come in with a three run lead in the bottom of the 9th to face a lineup’s 7-9 hitters is not necessarily getting the most bang for your buck.

Typically, this new type of thinking has been ignored by Major League clubs, who continue to trot their best relief pitcher out in ninth inning save situations. They tend to use this anointed closer regardless of platoon splits or any of the other factors mentioned above. Over the past couple of years however, there have been a few managers on the block that look like they could be interpreted as trying something differently; if you look at it in the right light that is.

To be clear, no manager has come out and said that anything that refers to a more progressive approach to bullpen management. But even if someone is trying to do things differently, why make it into an issue and create a story in the media? Big league managers are in a different position than people looking at the game from a purely analytic role. There is more to lose and people to answer to. With that said, certain managers, like Robin Ventura, Don Mattingly and Joe Maddon have made the “peculiar” decision to appoint someone other than their best reliever as the team’s closer. In the right light, this may suggest that maybe (and it is a big maybe), they are thinking a little differently about bullpen management.
In Chicago, Ventura has chosen to use Hector Santiago in many of the team’s save situations, instead of the harder throwing Matt Thornton and Addison Reed. Using Santiago in a majority of save situations, frees up Reed and Thornton to pitch in higher leverage situations that the game dictates. Meanwhile, in Los Angeles, sophomore manager Don Mattingly has chosen to stick with closer Javy Guerra instead of turning the job over to dominating setup man, Kenley Jansen; much to the chagrin of fantasy owners everywhere. Like Ventura and Mattingly, the always forward thinking Joe Maddon has elected to use Fernando Rodney instead of Jake McGee or Joel Peralta. By refraining from committing their best reliever to work the 9th inning, these managers are free to use their most dominant bullpen arms as they see fit.

After Sunday’s game, in which Matt Thornton, not “closer” Hector Santiago, was sent out to pitch the 9th inning, rookie manager Ventura, made comments that could be interpreted in a way that suggest he may be going against the old baseball wisdom of defined bullpen roles. Ventura said the following to Kerry Walls of MLB.com about managing his pen:
"I think it kind of goes with the game and how games are going," Ventura said, "how guys are feeling. I feel like I understand it. It's just more of getting to know your guys and who might need a day and who might not. But the game kind of dictates what happens."

He isn’t coming out and saying that they don’t need a defined closer, but he is suggesting that roles don’t need to be etched in stone.

Some may look at Fernando Rodney, Javy Guerra and Hector Santiago and see ineffective closers. If you’re being optimistic, these closers could mark a changing of the guard in bullpen management. Like a Marxist interpretation of Die Hard, just because you can correlate something, doesn’t make it true, but change happens gradually in baseball, so maybe (and it’s a big maybe), not committing your best relief pitcher to the 9th inning is the first step to getting rid of rigid and defined bullpen roles that allow for a more fluid and ultimately more effective use of relief pitchers.